where Δ is any sequence of obs and HX stands for "X is a proposition".
Motivation for this deduction theorem was given in [2] using the following three valued tables (that for implication also appears in Kleene [6] ). where N can stand for "neither J nor F" and Γ (negation) can be defined by CP(ΞHI), 1 A question that arises is: to what extent are the entries in the third column and the third row of the table for implication uniquely determined by DTP, modus ponens and the (fairly obvious) rule: H IhHI?
1. Here P stands for implication. EHI, which can be interpreted as stating that all propositions are provable, is taken as the "standard false" proposition. Given that SHI is assigned F the table for Γ follows from that for D.
After part (iii) on page xx, below we assume for SHI:
ZH\,HXhX.
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We show below that the three N entries are in fact uniquely determined in the sense that we cannot consistently have a T or an F in that position. Either or both of the T entries, however, may be N as even a slight extension of the above set of rules is insufficient to enforce a T in either place. Thus there are four possible truth tables for 3, each giving rise to a different form of propositional calculus similar to that developed in [2] . The fact that the N in the table for H is unique has already been shown. The simplest version of this appears in [4] . 2 We will say that a particular set of axioms and rules fits a truth table if for every entry T or F we have a corresponding introduction rule such as:
TXhXO Y
for any X and Y; for each entry N we require only that there is no introduction rule such as:
or
TYhΓ(XD Y)
for all X and Y (or even for all Y and all X such that not h i and not \-TX (i.e., not hHX)), which would force the assignment of a T or an F where we had an N in the table.
Because of the uniqueness of the Ns in the table for implication it will follow that rules such as:
which might seem reasonable in view of the deduction theorem, and
do not fit any of the possible truth tables and are in fact inconsistent with Modus Ponens, DTP and H.
We now show the uniqueness of each of the Ns.
(i) Let X be any theorem and let
where Y is the paradoxical combinator, then 2. This also shows that the system suggested towards the end of [3] which has hH(HJf) for all X as well as Modus Ponens, DTP and H inconsistent. 
Again by DTP as we must have HHX,
HFhID TY and so
HFhF (4)
Thus by (3) and (4) we cannot have HF as Y cannot be assigned both T and F hence Y must be assigned N in a truth table. Thus with X being assigned T and TY N, X 3 TY is assigned N. N must therefore be the entry in the first row and third column of the truth table for implication. 
Thus by (5) and (6) we again cannot have h-HF, SO F must be assigned N. Also TY is assigned N and so is F 3 ΓF. Thus the entry in the third row and third column must be N. Now by DTP applied to both of these steps we have:
and HFHF3 TX,
Thus by (7) and (8) we cannot have HHF, Y must therefore be assigned N, TX is assigned F and Y D TX is assigned N. Thus the entry in the third row and second column must be N.
The three N entries in our original truth table for D must therefore be N. Now we examine the T entries: We assume:
and
HH(ΞHI) (10)
which certainly fit the truth tables; and we, for the first time make use of the actual definition of our standard false proposition ΞHI.
and by repeating this process we obtain:
X, TX, H k+l Y\-Y.
As we have by (9) and (10)
it follows that
If we also have
which fits the table for Γ, we can prove as well:
ΓX, H k+1 Y\-X-D Y (14)
Thus if we have a F such that v-T(H k Y) for a k ^ 1, we have a case
where Y has the truth value N, X has the truth value F and X 3 Y has the value T.
There may conceivably be obs Y such that we do not have HH^Ffor any k. In that case no method such as the above provides us with a value for X ^> Y when X is F, so that X 3 Y must be assigned N. This N can be made unique for the second row and third column position if we add as a rule:
Note that (12) or (14) (with appropriated) and (15) lead to:
for all Y, so that it must be impossible to prove \-Γ(H ik Y) for all F, for k>l.
Alternatively we could have a strong negation satisfying IhΓID F.
(17)
This would give us a T in the second row and third column of the truth table for D.
(v) Using DTP it is easy to show:
so that if HΓ(HX) (Note: X could be H f Z for some Z and t) we have an X with the value N and HX with the value F. If F then has the value T, F ^. N ^ T would have to be T. If we have (17) this is guaranteed irrespective of whether N 3 T is N, T, or F. (15) and (16) do not effect the result here so our options are left open completely.
We can assign a unique N to the position in the third row and first column by adding the rule:
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This fits the truth table for D whether the entry in the third row and first column is T or N. Also it does not clash with (15) or (16), it is in fact derivable from them, Rule H and (9). In addition PH is comptabile with (17). Thus PH is compatible with all possible truth tables.
In [2] the following two "elimination rules" for H(X^> Y) were also mentioned:
and X, H(I3 F)hHF.
In view of (iii) (21) fits all possible truth tables and in view of (i) so does (22).
Other elimination rules for D such as:
and ΓF,I3 7hΓI (25) also fit the table, but none of (21)-(25) can be proved in an unrestricted form from Modus Ponens, DTP, H, and (9) or PH.
We should note that all the options we have suggested are left open in work based on [1] and [2] , as the general theorems of [2] on which later work is based has all relevant terms restricted to being in H.
We now look at the effect of the various truth tables for 3 on those for V and Λ. V and Λ are defined in [2] by:
We will give AXY the value T if (X 3. y D z) 3 z has the value Γ whenever HZ has the value T (i.e., Z has the value T or F). We give hXY the value N if (X 3. 
